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ABSTRACT
In the electronics industry, Design for Supply Chain principles are employed in an attempt to
reduce the impact of component obsolescence. When a supplier discontinues a component, the
costs to the customer are high. The customer can choose to redesign the product(s) the
component is used in, or can purchase all of the components the customer projects needing to
manufacture and support the product(s) for the remainder of its(their) lifetime (called a lifetime
buy).
The goal of this thesis is to develop a risk analysis methodology and supporting tools to help
design engineers reduce the use of parts at high risk for obsolescence in new products. This
approach was developed in conjunction with the Design Chain Solutions Group at Agilent
Technologies' Santa Clara, California site.
An algorithmically determined risk metric was developed to communicate the level of risk
incurred by a printed circuit board design. A proof-of-concept level risk analysis application was
also developed to compute the risk metric and display risk information to design engineers. The
effectiveness of the risk metric and risk analysis application was tested in a pilot program.
Expected impacts of a successful materials risk analysis program at the design engineer level
include a reduction in cost of sales, reduction in the time to market for new products, and
reduction in inventory holding costs.
Thesis Advisors:
Daniel E. Whitney, Sr. Research Scientist, MIT Center for Technology, Policy, and Industrial
Development
Sara L. Beckman, Sr. Lecturer, Management of Technology, Haas School of Business,
University of California, Berkeley
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1 BACKGROUND
This thesis is centered about an internship project performed with Agilent Technologies
during the summer and fall of 2001. The internship focused on the new product development
process, and specifically on the assessment of the components chosen by design engineers for
their products. The organizational home for the internship was a corporate organization, Design
Chain Solutions (DCS), but the target users of the work were the engineers in the product
divisions.
This chapter provides some background on the importance of new products to Agilent, the
organizational and cultural environment in which the project was performed, and the economic
situation in which Agilent found itself at the time of the work. The internship project, problem
statement, project parameters, and the project goals are also introduced.
1.1 COMPANY
Agilent's businesses date back to the beginnings of the Hewlett-Packard (HP) Company,
which was founded in 1939. HP's first products were the ancestors of the test and measurement
equipment that now make up Agilent's largest division. In 1999, HP decided to spin off some of
its core businesses into an independent company. This independent company became what is
now Agilent Technologies on November 1, 1999.
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1.1.1 Divisions and Products
Agilent is divided into three primary divisions: Test and Measurement, Semiconductor
Products, and Chemical Analysis and Life Sciences. For each of these divisions, the rapid
introduction of innovative new technologies and products has historically played a critical role in
HP/Agilent's strategy.
'Figure taken from Agilent Profile Slides, Agilent Technologies, Inc., 2001
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Figure 2:- Agilent's Organization
1. 1. 1.1 Test and Measurement
The Test and Measurement division is the largest division, generating 65% of revenue. Test
and Measurement has three subdivisions or groups: Automated Test, Communications Solutions,
and Electronic Products and Solutions Group (EPSG). Agilent considers the core businesses of
Test and Measurement to be communications test equipment, electronics test equipment,
automated test equipment, and services. Opportunities for future development include optical
broadband, data networking and wireless test equipment as well as broadband network
monitoring and network management software. The semiconductor test group is working to
develop systems-on-a-chip and high-speed memory test equipment.
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The internship project, while designed to address all of Agilent's businesses, focused on
EPSG. EPSG designs and manufactures electronic instruments such as Spectrum Analyzers and
Component Test Devices.
1.1.1.1.1 Semiconductor Products
The Semiconductor Products division is the next largest in Agilent, accounting for 24% of
revenue. Core businesses of this division include fiber optic communications, high-speed
networking, RF/microwave devices, imaging devices, infrared components, ASICs (Application
Specific Integrated Circuits) and optoelectronics. Some of the areas the Semiconductor Products
division is currently developing are gigabit networking, cellular chipsets and wireless appliances.
1.1.1.1.2 Chemical Analysis and Life Sciences
While currently the smallest division in Agilent, contributing only 11% of revenue, the
Chemical Analysis and Life Sciences division is probably the most exciting. This division is
Agilent's emerging market investment, and is projected to grow astronomically in the coming
years. The Chemical Analysis and Life Sciences division plays in the genetic solutions space,
aiding drug discovery and diagnostics work. The core businesses are gas chromatographs, liquid
chromatographs, mass spectrometers and services and supplies. Areas for opportunity include
bioinstrumentation and microfluidics.
1.1.2 Structure
Agilent, as would be expected, retained much of the structure and culture of HP after the
spin-off. A highly decentralized organization was the result. One of the motivations for having
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a decentralized organization is to increase the speed of innovation and decision-making, resulting
in a fast-moving and flexible organization. A common disadvantage of decentralized
organizations is lack of shared learning and best practices across divisions. Agilent is
representative of decentralized organizations on both fronts.
Sharply contrasting with my previous experience at Intel, Agilent's decision-making
structure seems to be somewhat of a "free market" model. While Intel urges teams to make use
of the "disagree and commit" policy, a decision at Agilent will remain unmade until all decision
makers agree. Another sharp contrast is Agilent's lack of cross-functional management
committees that are endowed with top-down decision-making authority. The decentralized
structure lends itself to an adoption-oriented model of implementation. For example, at Intel I
would have developed the Early Materials Risk Analysis (EMRA) tool, and tested it in a group
designated by a Steering Committee. I would then return to the Steering Committee to present
my results, and with their buy-in, would begin an implementation and training program in which
the users had no choice but to use the tool. The Steering Committee would expect to see
frequent reports on the metrics, therefore requiring a certain frequency of tool use. Conversely,
at Agilent I worked at the lower levels of the organizational chart, using influencing skills to
garner support for my project. I reported my findings and progress to Design Chain Solutions
(DCS) management, but they were not empowered to dictate the participation of a pilot group or
the usage of the EMRA tool.
During interviews in an effort to generate project support and a list of requirements for the
EMRA tool, interviewees stated repeatedly "if the tool doesn't meet X requirement, no one will
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use it". This supports the thesis that Agilent is a free market model. If a user, or an entire group
of users, doesn't want to adopt the EMRA tool, they simply won't. The only reason they will
use it is if they find it to be useful to their business. Decentralization and lack of cross-functional
management committees allows each division to make its own decision about which tools to use.
Convincing groups to use a tool requires demonstrating the usefulness of the tool to that
particular group, and customizing it to suit their needs.
There are, of course, pros and cons of the free market model. On the downside, anyone
encouraging use of a new tool will need to put a huge amount of time and effort into convincing
each and every group of its benefits. A lot of support will be required to provide customization
required to encourage usage. And, of course not every group will end up adopting the system, so
getting any kind of standardized tool to be used Agilent-wide is next to impossible. On the
positive side, each group is empowered to do what's best for that group. A decision not to use a
given tool may very well be the right decision for that group. We just need to beware of local
optimization when global optimization may yield a larger overall benefit. Another positive
aspect is that people who have a choice about adoption will tend to be more committed to the
program. If they use the tool or support its use, it is because they truly believe it to be a valuable
tool.
1.1.3 Culture
Agilent's documented values are:
1. Innovation and contribution
2. Trust, respect and teamwork
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3. Uncompromising integrity
4. Speed
5. Focus
6. Accountability
The first in the list, innovation, is a take-away from HP culture. The HP slogan is "Invent".
The Agilent slogan is "Innovating the HP way". Clearly there is a very strong focus on and
respect for the creative innovation process at Agilent. Since the internship goal was to introduce
operational focus during the innovation process, this first value played a big role in the project
and learning.
Another observation of Agilent culture came during the discovery process - figuring out
how to get things done. It quickly became clear that at Agilent, you get things done through
people. The social contact and reliance on one's personal network to be successful is probably
one of the reasons people love working there and tend to stay at Agilent for their entire careers.
Since the project was on a tight timeline and I was completely unfamiliar with the
landscape, I required a lot of help, especially initially. My project mentors helped get me in
touch with key players. I met with these people individually, to get their thoughts on my project
and to begin to build relationships. They, in turn, gave me names of other people who had
particular expertise or access to resources I would need to continue the project. I was very
impressed with the knowledge and friendliness of everyone I met with. I truly enjoyed my
experience at Agilent, primarily because of the great people I was privileged to work with.
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However, someone objectively observing the situation may be concerned with the abundance of
tacit knowledge within the company, especially given the recent and forthcoming employee
cutbacks.
1.1.4 Economic Climate
At the time of the internship, several measures were being undertaken to mitigate the impact
of the severe economic downturn. In March of 2001 a company-wide 10% pay cut was
implemented, resulting in a $280 million annual savings. While the pay cut was unpopular,
employees seemed willing to sacrifice a little bit personally for the better good of the company -
to avoid layoffs. This offers strong evidence of the people-centric Agilent culture. "This was a
matter of saving employees," says Stacy Yu, 25, who handles marketing for fiber-optic products.
"It sounds hokey, but it's like a family. Everyone knows that we have to chip in to make sure that
everyone else is okay." 2
Another measure instituted was a push within the R&D ranks to get new products out the
door. According to Agilent CEO Ned Bamholt, "We really have accelerated some of our most
important R&D programs, because we know our secret weapon in downturns like this are new
products. Even if our customers are in tough shape, if you can come up with a product that can
save them money or help them grow their revenue, they are willing to look."3
2 Daniel Roth, "How to cut pay, lay off 8,000 people, and still have workers who love you", Fortune, 4 Feb 2002,
62-68
3 Tim McElligott, "This way out: Ned Barnholt, Agilent Technologies", Telephony, 4 June 2001, 86-88
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Despite these efforts, severe discretionary cost cutting, and the sale of Agilent's Healthcare
Division to Philips Electronics for $1.7 billion, sales were plunging and Agilent was running out
of cash. Ned Barnholt and the other Agilent executives came to realize that cuts in the workforce
were the only remaining option.
The first round of layoffs, 9% of the workforce or 4000 employees, was announced in
August, 2001 and was complete by mid-September. Barnholt and the management teams
executed the layoffs with the utmost respect to employees. Barnholt himself announced the cuts
over the company PA system before announcing to Wall Street. He wanted the employees to
hear it straight from him before they read it in the news. In the address, he explained the
rationale for the cuts and how the number of layoffs was determined. "This is the toughest
decision of my career," he said, sounding fatigued. "But we've run out of alternatives."
The second round of layoffs, another 4000 employees, was announced on November and
was completed by the end of January 2002. Even with significant workforce reductions, Agilent
employees, including the ones losing their jobs, did not seem to resent the company. They
seemed to understand that the cuts were an absolute last resort, and that they were necessary
casualties of a depressed economy.
1.2 INTERNSHIP PROJECT
The project sponsors, managers in Agilent's corporate Design Chain Solutions (DCS) group,
worked with the LFM administration for several months to develop the Early Materials Risk
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Analysis (EMRA) project. Being in corporate group provided a different vantage point of the
organization than that of a particular division.
DCS was formed to provide organization-wide focus on supply chain initiatives at the
product design level. The mission of DCS' parent organization is: Through enterprise process
leadership and world-class hosted services, Enterprise Supply Chain Services (ESCS) delivers
investment flexibility to achieve financial goals, a segmented total customer experience and
compliance with regulatory requirements together with our business partners to Agilent,
customers, suppliers and partners.
DCS' Mission is: Provide Agilent Business Units with the competitive advantage to develop
and deliver its products and services by creating and sustaining:
" The central product generation system
" Processes and tools that decrease time-to-volume and lower cost of sales
" Linking the design environment into order fulfillment processes
" Turning critical information into design expertise 4
Both the ESCS and DCS organizations were formed from similar groups within HP.
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
The impetus for the internship project came from a costly problem identified in EPSG,
specifically an obsolescence risk with board-mounted commodity components. Although the
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result of the work was to be applicable company-wide, the scope of the internship was thereby
focused on EPSG.
Each of the EPSG instrument designs consists of several printed circuit boards, with board-
mounted electronic components. Teams of electrical design engineers in this group divide the
work up by board, with each engineer developing 1-2 boards per project.
There are some existing tools and methods for assessing a new design's material risk in
EPSG. These methods are manual, cumbersome, have a slow feedback time, and occur late in
the product development cycle. Imperfections in current materials risk analysis methods allow
inclusion of sub optimal components in new designs. Once these designs reach production, the
manufacturing organization has to deal with component problems such as obsolescence, lengthy
lead times, or disruptions in supply. Historically the manufacturing organizations have
addressed the problems by purchasing and holding in inventory all of the projected parts
requirements for the lifetime of a product, qualifying a replacement component, holding a large
amount of safety stock for a long lead time item, or counteracting parts quality problems in
assembly.
The goal of the internship was to develop a risk analysis methodology that can be applied by
design engineers early in the design cycle to assess the materials risk of their designs. The
effectiveness of the approach designed was to be tested in a proof-of-concept pilot program.
4 Source: Agilent ESCS and DCS websites
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1.3.1 Proposed Solution
Before the internship officially began, it was clear that the project sponsors had a mental
model of the results of the project. They envisioned an automated Bill of Materials (BOM)
grading tool that would replace or supplement the existing risk analysis methods and inform the
design engineers of risky components included in their designs. This new tool would provide
real-time risk analysis to designers, and could be used very early in the product design cycle.
1.4 CONCLUSION
The internship was undertaken during a difficult time for Agilent, making it difficult to get
financial and human resources for parts of the project. However, cost savings and reduction of
time to volume are crucial to the organization. Consequently, the project was supported at high
levels of the organization, and ultimately was successful.
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2 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
This chapter describes the specific problems that the internship project was initiated to
address. It describes how the materials selection and risk analysis processes presently work,
including which groups are involved and when in the new product development cycle these
processes occur. Additionally, the information technology tools that currently support the
materials selection decisions and risk analysis processes are described. Next, the problems with
the current system are investigated, with focus on sub optimal outcomes such as lengthening
time to volume and obsolete inventory, and poor processes such as decisions being made late in
the process and evaluation output being unusable. The work undertaken by the DCS group to
remedy the problems is discussed.
2.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT
The problems that initiated the internship project were twofold. First, problems with the
current materials risk analysis process were becoming increasingly apparent. Risk analysis was
being performed late in the design cycle, when design changes were difficult to make. Also, the
turnaround time for risk analysis was much too long, delaying the feedback time to designers.
The second problem was a more immediate and urgent component obsolescence problem,
caused when a manufacturer decides to discontinue a part currently included on a manufactured
instrument. Component obsolescence was, and continues to be, very costly to Agilent, and has
contributed to very large raw materials inventories.
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Evidence of both of these problems, as well as an assessment of the magnitude of the
problems is presented in the next sections.
The sponsors of the project saw that improving the materials risk analysis methodology
could both improve the process and mitigate the component obsolescence problem. The Early
Materials Risk Analysis (EMRA) internship project resulted.
2.2 MAGNITUDE ASSESSMENT
Since the economic downturn, many companies including Agilent found themselves with
huge amounts of inventory on their hands. Production was fully ramped up when customers
initially began canceling orders. Finished goods inventory and work in process (WIP) began
rapidly piling up. The information lag between the order entry process and raw materials
purchasing meant that raw materials inventories were building as well.
When times were good and Agilent could sell everything they made, emphasis was on
output, not on inventory control. Consequently, a few bad inventory management techniques
crept in and remained unnoticed during the boom economy. However, very shortly after the
downturn it was very clear that Agilent had an inventory problem, and several task forces were
initiated to identify and resolve it.
A first step was to identify what kinds of goods were in inventory. The results of the study
indicated that a surprisingly large portion of all inventories were lifetime buy (LTB) parts. A
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description and discussion of LTB components is found in the following section. The exact
valuation of the LTB inventory is confidential, but it was sufficiently sizable to command
attention at the very highest levels of the organization. The inventory holding costs incurred
from LTBs are significant. 60-70% of the total LTB inventory was owned by EPSG. Given the
magnitude of the problem, especially the size of EPSG's contribution to it, it is easy to see why
the problem was receiving so much attention.
2.3 OPTIONS FOR DISCONTINUED COMPONENTS
When Agilent becomes aware that a part has been discontinued, a discontinuation notice is
issued by corporate procurement. Then each division using the part must assess their options: (a)
find a drop-in replacement part, if one exists, (b) do a lifetime buy, (c) do a total redesign to
qualify a new part, or (d) do a bridge buy which is a combination of (b) and (c).
2.3.1 Drop-in Replacement
If another part exists that has the same form, fit and function of the discontinued part, it can
be substituted directly into the manufacturing line. Administrative costs, estimated at several
thousand dollars, are still incurred to process the discontinuance, notify customers of the change,
etc. In addition, a new part number must be set up in the systems, inventory systems initiated,
and manufacturing processes adjusted if necessary. The drop-in replacement is the least costly
option, but still has significant cost and resource impacts.
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2.3.2 Lifetime Buy
When a drop-in replacement part is not available, performing a LTB is the next least painful
solution, and for this reason is selected often. A LTB consists of estimating the total divisional
demand for the discontinued part over the entire life of the products it is used in, and then
purchasing that amount of the part before the manufacturer actually shuts down the line.
Demand estimation is, to say the least, an inexact science. Underestimating this demand could
be disastrous, as a shortage would force a redesign very late in the product's lifecycle when the
cost of the redesign would not be recovered. Overestimating the demand results only in
additional inventory, and hence is the preferred side to err on. As previously discussed, the
inventory holding costs incurred from LTBs are significant, and have recently received a lot of
attention from Agilent management.
2.3.3 Total Redesign
Sometimes a LTB is not a viable option, either due to the prohibitive expected costs, or the
inability for a supplier to deliver the amount of inventory required for a LTB. In these cases, a
major redesign is required. Potential replacement parts must be thoroughly investigated, tested,
and qualified. The time and materials costs that go into a major redesign can easily cost 10-20
times more than a drop-in replacement.
2.3.4 Bridge Buy
A bridge buy occurs when the decision is to perform a redesign, but the expected duration of
the redesign effort exceeds the current inventory stock for the discontinued part. So, a mini-LTB
is ordered to supply the manufacturing line while the redesign efforts are underway.
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2.3.5 Summary
Clearly none of these options are without cost, and some of them have a high impact on
Agilent's cost structure. Finding a way to minimize component discontinuances would be very
valuable.
2.4 OBSOLESCENCE MANAGEMENT OUTSIDE AGILENT
Component obsolescence is not isolated to Agilent - it is a significant global problem for
corporations and government organizations. The problem is of such magnitude for the US
military and its contractors that a joint organization, the Government-Industry Data Exchange
Program (GIDEP), was formed to address it.
Additionally, a couple of companies have undertaken predictive obsolescence initiatives.
The goal of these initiatives is to assess the likelihood of component discontinuance over a given
timeframe, or to predict the time at which a component will be discontinued.
2.4.1 GIDEP5
GIDEP is fully managed and funded by the U.S. Government. It provides an automated
mechanism for the military and industry to share critical design and manufacturing information.
Subscribers find information in six primary categories: (1) engineering data on parts,
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components, materials and processes, (2) failure experience data as a result of ALERTs, Problem
Advisories, etc., (3) metrology data such as calibration procedures and technical manuals, (4)
product information data including product discontinuance notices, product change notices
(PCNs), and Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS), (5)
reliability and maintainability data on failure rates and replacement data, and (6) urgent data
request, which allows subscribers to query the GIDEP community for urgent problem resolution
assistance.
GIDEP subscribers, and DMSMS subscribers in particular, are all facing similar problems
with component obsolescence. They meet annually to discuss the year's progress, share best-
known methods, and set goals for the future. Presentations from the conferences generally have
three common themes. One is the need for avoiding designing in components that are known to
be "bad" (the goal of the EMRA project). Another is the need to reduce the impact of
component obsolescence, realizing that it is an inevitability given the comparative lifecycles of
products vs. components. And the last is the need for a way to predict during design when a
component is likely to be discontinued, a.k.a. predictive obsolescence.
In December of 2000, the Department of Defense adopted the DMSMS management
practices, which prescribe the following eight-step proactive approach to managing component
obsolescence 6:
1. Before introducing a new product, verify the obsolescence status of all designed-in
components as early as possible in the design process.
5 Information via the official GIDEP website at http://www.gidep.corona.navy.mil/datainf/faq.htm
6 Mark Husey, "Avoiding Component Obsolescence", September 2001, Printed Circuit Design, 28-30
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2. Avoid designing-in sole source components and be sure to look beyond a single vendor's
line card when evaluating options.
3. Select packaging adopted by multiple manufacturers, drop-in equivalents are the easiest
alternative to redesigns when faced with an obsolete component.
4. When testing a board, include potential drop-in replacement components from different
manufacturers and sources in the testing process to pre-qualify potential alternates.
5. New technology is always subject to revisions; consider this risk and weigh it carefully
against the relative value of the new capabilities offered by such technology.
6. Assess the risk of a given component going obsolete in the future by studying how many
manufacturers are picking up and dropping that technology or packaging.
7. Establish a method for tracking products and their components and regularly verify the
obsolescence status of all components for all projects throughout the product lifecycle.
8. When using 5-volt devices, consider using a voltage regulator (or providing alternate
power sources near high risk components) that can adapt to the different current
requirements of manufacturers' components.
One of the methodologies employed to address the component obsolescence problem by
large government agencies and contractors, as well as large companies, is a partnership of sorts
with suppliers. A well-designed partnership can ensure that a supplier knows the criticality of,
and expected demand lifetime for, a component in their portfolio. It can ensure that suppliers
notify key customers when they are considering discontinuing a product. It can also ensure
suppliers collaborate with customers to replace discontinued components with components that
are easy drop-in replacements. HP has recently experimented with a "portfolio" technique of
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contracting with suppliers. "Under the portfolio model, HP enters into a structured contract with
suppliers. Anticipating future component pricing trends and evaluating what its longer-term
requirements will be, HP agrees to buy a set amount over a period of time. The OEM assumes
the risk for that volume, regardless of changes in market conditions or fluctuations in supply or
demand. In return, suppliers will likely provide better pricing, know up front what HP's
commitment will be over an extended period, and be able to plan resources accordingly. 7"
Agilent, due to its relatively low volumes and high mix of products, does not have sufficient
power with its suppliers to form this kind of partnership. Figure 3 demonstrates alternative
supplier strategies based on degree of risk and amount spent for each supplier. Agilent's supplier
strategy is shown in the lower right hand quadrant of the matrix; clearly this is not an optimal
place to be.
$ Spent HI
with
Supplier
LO
LO HI
Risk Associated with Supplier
Figure 3: Agilent's Supplier Strategy
7 Jennifer Baljko Shah, "HP Focuses On Procurement Risk-Sharing ", 29 October 2001, EBN, 52
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2.4.2 Predictive Obsolescence
There are at least two firms that are attempting to predict when a component will be
discontinued. Both are targeted at the early design phase, in an attempt to inform of the expected
remaining lifetime of a component under consideration for new design.
i2, as part of their extensive software suite, offers customers a subscription to their
component database. One of the fields maintained for certain categories of components is Years
to End of Life (YTEOL). YTEOL can be < 1 year, 1-4 years, 4-8 years, or > 8 years. i2
considers the YTEOL algorithm to be a very valuable piece of intellectual property, and hence
did not disclose the detailed formula. They did list the primary attributes that are included in the
calculations:
* Information directly from suppliers - when the supplier anticipates discontinuing the part
* Sales volumes
* Manufacturer-specific history - conditions under which they tend to discontinue parts
* Adoption rate
" Agencies' technical roadmaps
" i2's own technical roadmap
" PCN (part change notice) alerts
" Agencies' market trend analysis
" Component lifecycle analysis expertise gained from the acquisition of Tactech
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The company obtains and maintains much of this information from suppliers via telephone
and e-mail, coordinated through a large call center in India. i2 was unable to provide validation
to indicate the historical accuracy of the YTEOL metric.
Many companies are concerned about the legal ramifications of offering such a metric,
because if potential customers do not purchase a component because of its short YTEOL, that
directly affects the manufacturer's bottom line. If the manufacturer believes the prediction to be
unfair, they may take legal action.
The second company that has taken an approach to predictive obsolescence is R. Morley
Inc. (RMI). RMI is a consulting firm specializing in leading edge manufacturing technologies.
InvisiTech, an RMI affiliate has proposed using the theory of Loosely Coupled Sets (LCS) to
attempt to predict component obsolescence.
LCS, roughly defined, describes the relationship between the number of measurements and
the accuracy of those measurements. Calculated accuracy of the result increases linearly as one
increases the accuracy of any one of the measurements. However, calculated accuracy of the
result increases exponentially as one increases the number of measures. The key is that as the
number of measurements increases, the necessary accuracy of those measurements can decrease
significantly and still maintain the desired calculation accuracy. Putting it into predictive
obsolescence terminology, instead of requiring a very accurate component lifecycle metric, one
could theoretically use several less-accurate measures such as volume, number of customers, and
sales margin and obtain the same, or better, level of predictive accuracy.
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RMI proposed a development effort for LCS as applied to predictive obsolescence to a
software company and several industry partners. The partners would provide the necessary
funding for the project in exchange for a limited-term exclusive license for the fruits of the
project. However, as the economy and the proposed partners' profits continued to deteriorate,
the project was, and remains, tabled.
RMI is only one of the organizations working on predictive obsolescence initiatives, but the
LCS approach is unique to RMI. Thus far, i2 is the only company to market a predictive
obsolescence metric.
2.5 PRODUCT DESIGN PROCESS
This section first describes who is involved in making materials selection decisions, and the
computer support systems they make use of. Next, the new product development process is
introduced, with emphasis on when in the process materials decisions are made.
2.5.1 Sonoma County EPSG
The project scope was confined to a focus on the Electronic Products and Solutions Group
(EPSG) division in Sonoma County, California. Therefore, most of the descriptions of current
process below refer to this specific group. The functions in the Sonoma County EPSG group
that played a role in the EMRA project are: (1) R&D Engineers across three Product Generation
Units (PGUs) - Signal Sources, Spectrum Analyzers, and Component Test, (2) divisional
29
Materials Engineers who support the PGUs and are generally assigned by commodity, (3)
divisional procurement group, (4) NPI planners, who manage materials, new part setups, and
potential manufacturing issues on the design teams, and (5) an Order Fulfillment (OF) site that
manufactures many of the instruments designed at the PGUs.
R&D electrical design engineers primarily design in one of two Computer Aided Design
(CAD) programs - Mentor or Electrical Engineering Design Program (EEDP). Mentor is a
widely used sophisticated commercial CAD program. EEDP was designed in-house many years
ago, and has survived several attempts to phase it out. It appears that EEDP is still used because
it supports some mechanical geometries and properties that Mentor does not, and some designers
simply have not learned Mentor and are more comfortable and faster at using EEDP.
2.5.2 Design Phases
EPSG has a well-defined Product Lifecycle Process to "provide a common 'roadmap' of
expectations across organizations" and "provide a standardized model for product development
efforts around which improvements may be identified". After each phase, a checkpoint review is
held with PGU management to ensure that all phase deliverables have been met before moving
into the next phase. The length of each phase varies significantly by product, but the entire
product development cycle is generally on the order of one to two years. The table in Figure 4
summarizes the new product development process and the role of materials risk analysis in each.
Note that the proposed EMRA process will have materials risk assessment done much earlier in
the product development process than it is currently done, and once started will happen on an
ongoing basis throughout development.
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Concept Investigation Definition Development Qualification Manufactudng
Does idea warrant Technical and market Specifications and Complete design Verify goals met and Begin production
Purpose further investigation? feasibility assessment parameters set work production ready life
Technology-enabling Spec-meeting Changes made if
Design Work Done Minimal components included components selected Completed problem found
Current Risk Analysis None Rarely done Rarely done Full review(s) Rarely done None
EMRA Proposal None Risky parts highlighted Full review(s) Full review(s) Continuing review Review as desired
Figure 4: New Product Development Process
2.5.2.1 Concept
The purpose of the Concept phase is to determine whether or not the potential product is
worthy of further investigation. Usually there is little to no design work done in this phase, since
the goal is simply to determine if the idea has merit.
2.5.2.2 Investigation
The purpose of the Investigation phase is to determine feasibility of the product idea, both
from a market and a technical standpoint. Technical feasibility can only be effectively assessed
if some degree of design work has been done. Design engineers verified in interviews that a
good portion of the initial design work is completed as part of the investigation phase, although it
is generally only a couple of months long. This is a very "fun" time for designers, since they are
fully utilizing their extensive creative and problem solving skills. The focus of the Investigation
phase is technology - designing a new capability or making a substantial performance
enhancement. An effective materials risk analysis methodology will give designers a tool to
avoid using risky materials during this critical phase that will not detract their focus from the
technology.
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2.5.2.3 Definition
The purpose of the Definition phase is to assess the development and testing requirements
for each of the boards in the instrument. The product specifications and technological
parameters are defined during this phase.
2.5.2.4 Development
The purpose of the Development phase is to design the product according to the
specifications set in the Definition phase. This is the phase in which the design work is the most
intensive, when prototypes are created and tested, when designs are refined. Currently, most
materials risk analysis and changes to components are made during the Development phase.
2.5.2.5 Qualification
The purpose of the Qualification phase is to verify that the specifications and goals set in the
Definition phase have been met, and to confirm that manufacturing and the supply chain are
ready to support production.
2.5.2.6 Manufacturing
There are several sub-phases of the manufacturing process, but in essence the product begins
its production life. Once the product passes the Qualification checkpoint, production engineers
become responsible for the product design. If a component is discontinued, production engineers
are responsible for any redesigns required.
2.6 PARTS SELECTION PROCESS
The last section described when, in the larger product development process, materials
selection takes place. This section describes how it occurs, both historically and presently. The
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current parts selection process for new designs makes use of Agilent preference codes (described
below) and standardized part search mechanisms. Throughout the years, EPSG materials
engineering has provided design engineers with many tools to allow effective parts selection.
2.6.1 Lab Stock Evolution
Twenty years ago, a large depository of components called Lab Stock was maintained at
each development site. When a designer needed a component, he or she went to Lab Stock, got a
component and plugged it into his or her board. If he wanted to utilize a component that was not
kept in Lab Stock, he had to fill out several forms and wait for the part to be ordered. Given the
pain of this process compared to the ease of grabbing something out of Lab Stock, all incentives
were aligned to ensure designers used the Lab Stock as much as possible. Therefore, to ensure
the maximal use of preferred parts in new designs, materials engineering and procurement
simply needed to limit the Lab Stock to preferred parts.
As technology developed, designers made increasing use of computers to complete their
designs, rather than physically building breadboard models. By the time the first prototype was
developed, many of the components had already been selected electronically. Control over use
of preferred parts began to diminish. To combat this trend, materials engineering and
procurement developed some tools to assist the designers in making the right choices while
designing electronically.
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2.6.2 Part Preference Determination
Agilent preference code is the existing system through which components are rated, and that
rating is communicated company-wide. The preference code is determined by the Materials
Engineering organization at the enterprise level and the division level. Preference codes are 1, 2,
3, or 4, in descending order of preference. Code 1 parts are considered to be "recommended for
new design", while Code 4s are not to be used. Some Code 3s and 4s also have a secondary
alphanumeric coding to indicate why the part is coded this way. For example, a Code 4X is a
part that has been discontinued by the supplier. In addition, sometimes a # or a ? are used to
indicate a changing or unknown preference code. These are intended to throw a "red flag" for
the designers. A sampling of preference codes that may be encountered and their associated
meanings are shown in Figure 5.
Code Interpretation
1 Recommended for new design
2 Recommended for new design, but less ideal than Code 1
3 Not recommended for new design, but OK if no other option
3A Sole source
4 Not recommended for new design
4X Part has been discontinued by the supplier
# Preference code is changing
7 Preference code is unknown (may be new part)
Figure 5: Sample Preference Codes
2.6.3 Parts Selection Mechanisms
Each year, an internally generated Parts Selection Guide (PSG), with a listing of the parts
that are "recommended for new design" is published in hard copy and soft copy. Given the ease
of grabbing a PSG off the shelf and finding a part, this remains a popular method of parts
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selection. This practice is somewhat concerning, because part preference can change quickly -
more quickly than the PSG is updated.
The latest and greatest parts selection tool in EPSG is the internally developed CAD Data
Store (CDS). CDS permits part searches on parameters, partial part number, etc. When search
results are displayed, they are displayed in order of Agilent preference code. Therefore, a
designer selecting the first part in the list is necessarily selecting the "best" part. CDS also has
the capability to drag and drop the component geometry directly into Mentor. CDS is clearly
superior to the hardcopy PSG, but not all designers have yet converted to using it.
2.6.4 Leveraging
"Leveraging" or "reuse" is another common, and highly encouraged, practice among the
design community. This refers to the practice of utilizing a board, or portion of a board, from a
previous design in a new design. Leveraging speeds up the product development cycle because
designers can begin their project with a portion of the design already complete. It also improves
manufacturing flexibility since more products make use of some of the same components.
A common misconception among the design community regarding leveraging is that
leveraged boards, since they went through the Materials List Analysis Review process (described
below) and were approved at some point, do not have materials issues. In fact, it is quite the
opposite. It is highly likely that some of the components were discontinued in the intervening
time between when the leveraged board was designed and the new board was designed.
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2.7 MATERIAL LIST ANALYSIS REVIEW
The Material List Analysis Review (MLAR) is the existing system for assessing the
materials risk of new designs before they are sent to Order Fulfillment. The process begins when
a designer uploads his material list file to an automated system, usually at the encouragement of
his NPI planner. As discussed in the previous section, this occurs most frequently during the
Development Phase, and occasionally during the Investigation or Definition Phases.
The system runs a query of the Materials Specification Master (MSM) database, and outputs
a very long, complex, difficult-to-interpret pipe-delimited ASCII text file. The file lists all of the
parts in the design (usually hundreds of parts), in order of preference code. Information included
in the file is Agilent part number, preference code, reference designator (location on the board),
part description, part performance parameters, and category code. Since all of the information is
in text, with little formatting, it is not easy to read. In addition, the Code 3 and 4 parts are listed
at the bottom of the file, so one must scroll all the way to the bottom to get to the risky parts. In
general, the MLAR output is not user-friendly.
The next step in the MLAR process is for divisional Materials Engineers to follow up on the
Code 3 and Code 4 parts, and find recommended replacements for them. Once they have
determined which part to recommend as a replacement, they will fill this information into the
"notes" section in the MSM database. When all Materials Engineers are finished making their
recommendations, the MLAR report is returned to the designer. This process typically takes
about two weeks. The final report the designer sees is the same complex, difficult-to-read output
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that was originally generated, but with the recommended replacement notes added to the Code 3
and Code 4 parts.
DESIGNER
Workstation
COMPONENT MATERIALS
DATABASE ENGINEERS
MLAR
Figure 6: Material List Analysis Review Process
According to designer interviews and a pre-pilot survey, the MLAR is run 1-2 times per
board, most frequently during the development phase.
Figure 7 demonstrates a general framework for understanding the increased relative costs of
making changes later in the design cycle. In this particular case, discovering a component
problem later in the design cycle causes more pain to make the change than if it were discovered
right up front. This diagram makes the case for the sub optimality of the existing materials risk
analysis process, because it is undertaken so late in the development process.
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Figure 7: Relative costs of making component changes late in the product development cycle
In summary, the current MLAR process is sub optimal on several levels, most notably the
lack of usability and the delay time between submission of the materials list and completion of
the report. The impact of being difficult to read and interpret is that designers dislike having to
sift through the file to get to the relevant information. This may lead to avoidance of the process
altogether, resulting in the current situation where designers often wait to run the process until
they are urged to do so by their NPI planner.
The impact of the two-week cycle time is more significant. The designers are often on a
very tight time schedule, and in the space of two weeks they can be on to a new project phase,
with new goals. They will have further developed the design, adding other components that are
sometimes dependent on, or complementary to, a part that is discovered to be risky. Going back
to replace a risky part at best is frustrating, since the designer must essentially return to the parts
selection process that he thought he had completed. Worse, an entire chain of components must
38
Component Change Difficulty
0
0!0
M 40
0a a)0 .
>i C>
be changed out to eliminate the risky part, costing the designer precious time and potentially
impacting the time to volume. In the most costly scenario, a new prototype must be built and
tested to verify that the new, non-risky part(s) will perform as desired. In this case, significant
direct cost is incurred to build and test the new prototype, and the schedule will likely be
impacted as well. It is not surprising, then, to find that sometimes designers choose not to
change out a risky part when it is discovered too late in the process. By making this choice, the
designer trades off the cost of a redesign or lifetime buy in favor of schedule.
2.7.1 Design Engineer Survey Results
Both of these problems were very clearly happening at Agilent, as was verified after
conducting a survey prior to designing and testing the new materials risk analysis tool. Two of
the questions gauged the frequency with which the designers discover risky parts from the
MLAR process. Responses indicated that they almost always find that they have inadvertently
selected a risky part. Not surprisingly, they even more frequently find that a leveraged part of
their design makes use of risky parts.
Probably the most poignant discovery from the pre-pilot survey was the fact that the
designers do not always change out risky parts with the recommended replacement parts.
Subsequent interviews indicated that often the reason is that the discovery is made too late in the
process and the pain/cost level for making the change is assessed to be too high (refer again to
Figure 7). This is a clear indication that the current process leaves significant room for
improvement and that there is real cost savings to be obtained by providing the risk analysis
earlier in the design cycle and improving the turnaround time.
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2.8 DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
This section describes the information systems that support the materials decisions.
Although not officially part of the original problem statement, Agilent is undertaking a major
revolution of their data/decision support systems. A transition to an Enterprise Resource
Planning (ERP) platform complete with a Product Data Management (PDM) module is
underway, with phased company-wide implementation beginning in the summer of 2002. Figure
8 demonstrates the decision structure of the current system. The integrity of decision support
systems such as the internal component database are critical to the players' abilities to make
decisions that positively affect Agilent's business.
Agilent's internal component database is called the MSM, for Materials Specification
Master. The MSM is an Informix database that has one original instance and several local
instances at most Agilent sites. It houses several fields of data for each of Agilent's parts, active
and inactive, including part number, cost, leadtime, and preference code. The MSM is rarely
accessed directly by engineers - instead, interfaces such as the CAD software, CAD Data Store
or the MLAR process query the database and return relevant MSM data. Although the MSM has
served Agilent well for many years, it has significant limitations, especially in the data structure.
A proposal to replace the MSM is expected in the next year or so.
The "Decision Support Systems" referenced in the Figure include the MSM database, the
ERP system and the PDM system.
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Figure 8: Agilent's Decision Support System Structure
2.9 COMPLEMENTARY PROJECTS
The Design Chain Solutions group has several other Design for Supply Chain (DfSC)
projects currently underway. Materials Lifecycle Risk Analysis and Next Generation Preference
Codes are two that are closely connected to the Early Materials Risk Analysis project.
2.9.1 Materials Lifecycle Risk Analysis
This project is an effort to assess the need for, test, and implement component risk
assessment information purchased from a third party. Typical third party risk attributes include
Lifecycle (where a part is in its lifespan), Availability (is the part kept in stock or not), Sourcing
(sole-sourced vs. multi-sourced), and Breadth of Usage (how many customers are purchasing the
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part). Although the Agilent preference code is intended to be the sole assessment of materials
risk, there may still be a need for third party data.
First, a third party may have information on a component that is not available in the MSM.
This could help decide on selection of a new part. Next, the MSM has hundreds of thousands of
components. It is unreasonable to expect that Materials Engineers can keep all of the preference
codes up to date at all times. A key benefit of a third party database is expedited processing of
Product Change Notices (PCNs) and adjustment of the risk ratings. Lastly, the third party
systems provide more information to the viewer. While Agilent preference code indicates
essentially "recommended for new design" or "not recommended for new design", third party
data indicates why that part is preferred or not preferred. Agilent currently has trial subscriptions
to a third party database, and is assessing the viability of the information.
2.9.2 Next Generation Preference Codes
Closely related to both the Materials Lifecycle Risk Analysis and the Early Materials Risk
Analysis is the Next Generation Preference Code project. The goal is to assess the possibility of
creating an algorithm to dynamically determine the preference codes. This scenario would likely
make use of a third party data source as input to the algorithm. The preference codes may be
dynamically updated to the MSM, or may require approval of Materials Engineering or others
before being updated.
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2.10 PROBLEM DEFINITION
The magnitude and complexity of the project could easily occupy a lone intern for several
years. In order to keep the scope under control, the project mentors limited the scope and
dictated specific project tasks. These tasks were to (1) assess the requirements for a Bill of
Materials grading tool, (2) execute a proof-of-concept level pilot program to test the viability of
such a tool, and (3) make recommendations regarding the implementation of the tool. The scope
was limited to board-mounted commodity components, and the focus group defined as the EPSG
Sonoma County division.
It would be important to design the tool so that it could, and would, be used earlier in the
design cycle than the MLAR process is employed.
2.10.1 Expected Impacts
Impacts of having materials risk information early in the design cycle include a reduction in
cost of sales due to a reduction in lifetime buys and redesigns. Another expected impact is a
reduction in the time to market for new products due to a reduction of design cycle iterations.
Yet another is reduction in inventory holding costs due to selection of lower leadtime
components. Lastly, and least measurable, is an improvement in design engineer effectiveness.
Effectiveness will be improved when the designers spend less time on parts selection and
redesign activities, and more time on the value-added creative design process. This improved
effectiveness may result in increased competitiveness (technological capability and/or
manufactured cost) of the products.
43
2.10.2 Risk Scoring Methodology and Risk Metric
A key goal of the internship was to determine how to score or grade a Bill of Materials
(BOM) or materials list. The vision was to design a single metric that would communicate the
risk level of a new design. A successful risk metric would communicate the overall materials
risk to a designer, indicating how much materials improvement was required for his design. It
would also communicate to management the level of materials risk being incurred by new
designs.
2.11 SUMMARY
The challenge for the internship was thus set. The goal was to find a way to both streamline
the process of component selection and evaluation during product development, and make the
process more effective in identifying and eliminating high-risk parts. The next chapter reviews
the approach taken during the internship to resolve the problems and improve the process.
The problem resolution approach was to first determine a risk metric(s) to measure the
materials risk incurred by a particular design. Next, an automated application was developed,
which took as input a material list and then output the risk score for the design. Finally, a small
group of design engineers tested the application and the risk metrics in a pilot program.
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3 RISK METRIC AND ALGORITHM DETERMINATION
3.1 RISK METRIC IMPORTANCE
To directly address the component obsolescence and lifetime buy inventory problems, the
designers would need to be informed of risky components included in their designs and then
replace them with less risky components. Developing an overall risk metric or risk score to
assess the status of the board would not directly resolve the problems or improve the current
process. However, a risk metric would serve several peripheral purposes, namely to measure
materials risk and to provide an incentive for designers to use the EMRA tool.
First, the risk metric would provide a way to measure reduction in materials risk over time.
At the project level, the risk score should improve over the product -development cycle so that by
the time the product is qualified for manufacturing the materials risk is as low as feasible.
Additionally, risk scores should improve as designers become more accustomed to using the
EMRA tool and designs that made use of the tool are leveraged (so that problems with leveraged
designs occur only due to changes in component risk status instead of an accumulation of prior
mistakes). In the absence of a risk metric, it would be difficult to demonstrate improvement in
materials risk due to the EMRA tool.
An effective risk metric will also provide critical incentive for designers to use the risk
analysis system. A risk metric can easily be reported and tracked through the management
chain. Without a risk metric it would be difficult for project managers and designers to be
evaluated based on their materials risk reduction efforts. The only way a metric can be reported
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and tracked is if the system generating the metric (in this case, the EMRA tool) is used. Of
course, the extent to which the risk score is linked to designer and project manager performance
evaluations will determine the strength of the incentive to use the EMRA. This dynamic is
investigated in more detail in the last chapter.
3.2 CURRENT APPROACHES To RISK ASSESSMENT
Working with a set of companies that offered supply chain management software made it
clear that there were two viable approaches to risk scoring. One was a deterministic approach -
taking a set of risk parameters, weighting each appropriately, and summing the result to
determine an aggregate risk score. Another was a probabilistic approach along the same vein as
R. Morley Inc.'s attempt at predictive obsolescence. A probabilistic scoring method would
assess the probability of a component being discontinued, and multiply by the expected cost of
the discontinuance to assess the expected cost of the design decision.
As discussed in the last section, i2 has also attempted to predict when a component will be
discontinued, in their Years To End Of Life (YTEOL) metric. YTEOL is offered as part of their
component database, to which customers subscribe. R. Morley Inc. has also investigated a
predictive obsolescence approach, suggesting the use of Loosely Coupled Sets to determine risk
of obsolescence. Both of these approaches differ from the methodology used by most supply
chain software companies.
8 It should be noted that there might be other metrics that would be equally valuable. For example, measuring
component obsolescence rate, or the cost of the LTB inventory are other ways to get people focused on this problem.
A broader metric might involve more people (e.g., materials engineers and procurement personnel) than just the
design engineers.
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The other software companies investigated as part of the internship offer customized risk
scoring by a deterministic method. This means that the customer selects which risk categories
represent the highest degree of risk, and the amount of weighting that each category should get.
A customer-determined algorithm then assesses a material risk metric or score, and uses the
metric to grade a Bill of Materials or filter components for selection in a new design.
Selecting which type of risk scoring should be employed for the pilot program was a
difficult choice since each has benefits and drawbacks. Most notably, the deterministic score is
simpler and more easily maintained than the probabilistic score, but does not incorporate an
aspect of cost to the organization. The pros and cons of each score are summarized in Figure 14.
Eventually it was decided that there was sufficient time allotted for the pilot to allow evaluation
of both methods. The pilot participants could then assess which score was preferable, and the
preferred method would then be used for the full implementation of the EMRA tool. Details
regarding the development of the two metrics as well as the pros and cons of each are described
in the following sections.
3.3 DETERMINISTIC RISK SCORE
Deterministic risk scoring involves taking a set of risk parameters, and then weighting each
of the parameters to determine a final score. For the purposes of the EMRA project, relevant and
available input parameters were the Agilent preference code (scale of 1-4), and four industry-
level risk assessment attributes from a third-party source (Lifecycle, Availability, Multi-Sourcing
Profile, and Breadth of Usage), each on a scale of 1-3 (low risk, medium risk, high risk). The
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third-party provider that Agilent was working with on a test subscription basis supplies these
metrics. This provider is a very large distributor of board-mounted electronic components, and
hence has visibility into statistics such as average lifetime, number of customers for a given
component, and whether or not the part is kept in stock. The metrics and their sources are
described in the table in Figure 9.
Metric Description Basis
Average lifetime of similar components,
Lifecycle Risk of discontinuance compared to current component age
Whether component is For this distributor, is the component kept on
Availability kept in stock hand or ordered as needed
Number of alternate Multiple sources for identical components
Multi-Sourcing Profile sources for the component reduces the risk of total obsolescence
Number of customers for If Agilent is the only customer, the manufacturer
Breadth of Usage the component may be more likely to discontinue
Figure 9: Third-Party Component Metrics
Discussions were held with several managers in DCS and Sonoma County, as well as the
thesis advisors for this paper in an attempt to assess the appropriate weighting scheme. Opinions
varied widely as to how much weight should be given to the Agilent preference code compared
to the third-party metrics. A Materials Engineering manager felt particularly strongly that the
third-party metrics should not be included at all, since the Agilent preference code should
already incorporate the third party data, and it is the Materials Engineer's job to do so and to
keep it current. Design engineers and their managers, on the other hand, were excited about the
prospect of having information in addition to the preference code with which to make risk
assessment decisions. After much discussion, the general consensus appeared to be that although
the Agilent preference code is intended to include the third party risk assessment, it is not
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practical to presume that it does. Realistically, Materials Engineers cannot keep up with the
thousands and thousands of parts and their related preferences, especially given the rapid pace of
change in the status of the parts. Further, their time might be better used in helping engineers
identify and use alternate, less risky parts. The exact weightings to be used were never agreed
upon by all of the managers. Eventually I made an executive decision, and used the weighting
scheme shown below for the pilot. Agilent preference code and Lifecycle were weighted most
heavily, given that they were likely the strongest indicators of component obsolescence, the
largest of the problems the EMRA project was formed to address.
Component-level Analysis Weight
Lifecycle Risk 25%
Availability Risk 10%
Multi-sourcing Risk 15%
Breadth of Useage Risk 10%
Agilent PC 40%
Figure 10: Weighting scheme for deterministic risk score
The weighting scheme should be adjusted as business conditions change and as more data
is gathered on apparent causes of discontinuance. When the EMRA project is fully
implemented, the third-party metrics as well as the deterministic risk rating should be recorded in
a database by component over time. As these components are discontinued, multiple regression
analysis could determine which of the metrics tends to be the stronger predictor of the timing of
obsolescence. An example of business conditions changing is the completion and
implementation of the Next Generation Preference Code project. This project will make use of
third-party data, and may eliminate the need for the weighting scheme altogether. Perhaps an
aggregate Preference Code for the board is all that will be required. Annual evaluations of the
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weighting scheme should be sufficient given the rate of business condition change and the
resources likely to be available to analyze the data.
The risk assessment scheme described above was performed at the component level,
meaning each component in the material list was assigned a score based on that component's
attributes and the weighting of each attribute. After the component risk score was computed, the
score was multiplied by the component cost and dubbed the "dollar-weighted component risk
score". This practice ensured that the more expensive components (which invariably have higher
LTB and redesign costs) were considered more risky. The dollar-weighted component risk was
then summed up across all components in the materials list. This was dubbed the "aggregate
dollar-weighted risk score".
The question then became how to normalize the score so that it could be compared across
boards, products and projects. Dan Whitney, a thesis advisor, suggested that a reasonable
approach was to employ a standard Boothroyd Design for Assembly9 technique of using a
percentage score equal to the actual score divided by the ideal score. In this case, the ideal score
would be obtained if the Agilent preference code was 1, and each of the third party categories
were rated low risk. That equates to a component risk score of 1, and an aggregate dollar-
weighted risk score of the raw materials cost. Therefore, the deterministic risk score utilized in
the pilot was a percentage score of the raw materials cost of the board divided by the aggregate
dollar-weighted risk score.
9 Geoffrey Boothroyd, Peter Dewhurst, and Winston Knight, Product Designfor Manufacture and Assembly, (New
York: Marcel Dekker, Inc. 1994).
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An example calculation of the deterministic risk score for a fictitious 4-component board
using the weighting scheme in Figure 10 is shown in Figure 11 below.
Preference Multi- Breadth Component Component $-Weighted
Part Number Description Code Lifecycle Availability Sourcing of Usage Risk Score Cost Component Risk
1658-8253 RESISTOR 100 +/11 1% 4 1 1 3 1 2.5 $ 0.01 $ 0.03
6958-5866 TRANSISTOR MOSFET 1 1 3 2 1 1.35 $ 1.35 $ 1.82
7812-1111 IC INTERFACE BIPOLAR 2 2 1 2 2 1.9 $ 0.12 $ 0.23
4545-0014 IC DRIVER CMOS 4 3 1 1 2 2.8 $ 30.78 $ 86.18
$ 32.26 $ 88.26
Raw, Aggregate $-
Materials Weighted Risk
Cost Score
Risk Score = Raw Materials Cost/Aggregate Risk Score
Figure 1 J Board-Level Deterministic Risk Scoring Methodology
The next challenge was to determine what represented a "good", "medium" and "poor" risk
level at the board level. Ideally the risk score would be color-coded green, yellow or red so that
the designer could see at a glance how high the risk level was. It would also provide the designer
with a baseline - for example, is a 65% score good or bad? The answer is that it depends on the
type of design. Revolutionary designs may score lower than evolutionary designs due to the high
usage of new, unknown materials. A board that does not leverage a previous design may include
fewer older components and may score higher than a heavily leveraged board. In addition,
designs in one PGU might score differently than in another.
After running several test material lists, the scoring levels shown in Figure 12 were
determined to be reasonably applicable to all designs. This scheme should not be considered
absolute, and should definitely be adjusted once the EMRA tool has been in use for several
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months. Specifically, risk scores should be recorded for many different types of boards, and
statistics calculated to assess significant differences between the scores based on the differences
among boards.
When the tool is first introduced, it is probably best to set one scheme, and let project
managers decide if a score is too low for the type of product that is being designed. In time, they
will learn through experience what types of scores to expect for their teams. Trying to maintain
a separate color scheme for each type of product that might be designed would be a maintenance
headache, the value of which is unclear.
Definitions Ideal/Actual (>)
YELLOW 40%
Figure 12: Color-coding scheme used for deterministic risk scoring
3.4 PROBABILISTIC RISK SCORE
As the efforts of R. Morley Inc. and i2 make clear, existing technology regarding predictive
obsolescence is very new and largely not validated, expensive and of limited value. In addition,
the amount of data Agilent currently tracks regarding discontinuances is insufficient to make an
informed analysis of the probability of discontinuance. The attempt at a probabilistic risk score
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for the pilot was made to ascertain how the pilot designers would react to having the risk score
quantified in terms of dollars.
A high-level R&D manager mentioned in an interview that ideally, all risks would be related
back to cost. The designers have a lot of things to think about while they are designing, and are
evaluated on many fronts. He felt that an effective risk metric would be related back to one of
the existing metrics that designers already care about, cost being foremost amongst them.
Further development of this suggestion resulted in the concept of "expected materials
penalty cost of this design". It seemed it would be beneficial to give the designers a dollar figure
that assessed the expected cost that Agilent would incur due to the sub-optimal portions of their
materials selection. Ideally, this metric would represent the sum of expected component
penalties across all components in the design. The expected component penalty would be
assessed by multiplying the probability of that component being discontinued over the next 5 (or
whatever) years, by the expected cost of that discontinuance.
In reality, assessing this probability during the pilot was very difficult to do accurately
without purchasing the i2 YTEOL metric or doing extensive statistical analysis on data that
Agilent does not currently track. Figure 13 represents a probabilistic scoring scheme that
seemed reasonable based on discussions with the third party data provider and several managers
in DCS and EPSG. Parts that are considered high risk (by the third party database) in the
lifecycle risk category were given 100% chance of being discontinued over the following 5
years. Parts considered high risk in the availability risk category, however, were given only a
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10% probability of being discontinued or otherwise incurring risk due to availability. Although
these parts could clearly cost the company some money (i.e., by not being readily available when
needed), from a component obsolescence perspective, they were less critical. The third party
data provider was selected for testing as part of the Materials Lifecycle Risk Analysis project in
DCS. Designers were not informed that the cost was a poor approximation of the actual cost. If
they did not trust the output, that they would have a hard time assessing it fairly.
Probability ot
Incurring Costs if
Component-level Analysis 
"High Risk"
Availability Risk 10% 0%Multi-sourcing Risk L 5  1
Breadth of Useage Risk 10% 20%
AgilentPC 40% 100% 25%
PC = 4
Figure 13: Probabilistic Risk Scoring Calculations
Figure 14: Comparison ofDeterministic and Probabilistic Risk Metrics
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PC0=3 1
Deterministic Metric Probabilistic Metric
Pros * Simple 0 Links materials risk to cost to the
* Easily understood by users organization
* Easily maintained o Allows users to readily assess tradeoffs
based on cost
Cons * Does not tie risk directly to cost to 0 Complex
the organization o Difficult to maintain
o Accuracy may be questioned by users
4 PILOT
4.1 APPLICATION DEVELOPMENT
To communicate the materials risk score and the supporting detail to the design engineers
during the pilot, an application to read in a materials list, process the risk algorithm, and display
the results of the analysis would be required. Figure 15 maps out the systems view of the EMRA
pilot application. Since the pilot was intended to be only a proof-of-concept, the pilot
application could be very rough and have some manual steps. In the long term, however, any
risk assessment application would have to be completely automated and very user-friendly.
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CAD MISM Third-party
Database Database Database
Designer o ation
Read in Material
Material List List, query MSM
database for
relevant statistics
Material List with Read in Material List
MSM data (including with MSM data, query
preference code) third party database
for risk metrics
Material List with
Output risk score MSM data and third-
and detail Run risk algorithm party data
Figure 15: EMRA Pilot Application Flowchart
4.1.1 Process
It was clear very early on that IT resources would be critical to the success of the project,
and be exceptionally difficult to come by. The ERP and PDM implementation projects were
usurping all of the IT resources the company had to give. In addition, the IT group was
centralized, and therefore the EMRA project proposal had to compete with every other IT project
proposal in Agilent for the minimal amount of available additional resources.
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Agilent's IT group has standardized the resource request process, by requiring certain
forms to be filled out to initiate the process. The forms included a description of the project,
expected amount and duration of IT resources required, and project ROL. Understanding the
criticality of IT resources to the project, the proper forms were submitted in the first three weeks
of the internship. The status of the request was checked on at least once a week. Ten weeks into
the internship IT management finally made a decision that they would not be able to support the
EMRA project. Immediately a contingency plan was enacted in which a contractor was hired to
do the application programming. To keep the cost at a minimum, I agreed to program the user
interface in Excel. The user interface took a comma-separated value file as an input, and then,
through a series of macros, crunched the data and displayed it to the user.
Unfortunately, the process of using the contractor was not as easy as originally
anticipated. The contractor was located in Oregon, had difficulty accessing Agilent's systems
remotely, and required Agilent IT assistance to gain access. She did not have an understanding
of the MSM data structure, and therefore required an Agilent employee to write the SQL script to
query the database. Due to delays in gaining access and finding someone to write the script, she
ran out of time to do much in the way of programming. At this point another contingency plan
was enacted, and a senior IT person in the DCS group was talked into doing most of the
programming after the contractor's departure. He ended up scrapping much of what she had
done.
Another issue encountered was the incorporation of third party component risk data into the
pilot. Shortly before the pilot was scheduled to kick off, the Materials Lifecycle Risk Analysis
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project began an alpha test with a third party to allow a few Agilent test users to access their Risk
Manager database. Incorporation of third party data was critical to the success of the pilot, since
without it the risk metrics would have only Agilent Preference Code as an input. Ideally, the
Risk Manager data would be automatically pulled into the pilot application. The third party and
the consultant worked to identify ways in which this might be feasible, but it was determined that
it would be too time-consuming and resource-intensive to complete this functionality in time for
the pilot. It was determined that the pilot users would each have to go to the third party's web
site, upload a file of Manufacturer Part Numbers (MPNs), run the risk manager, and then
download the resultant file back to the application environment.
4.1.2 Result
The original plan to use Agilent IT resources was reworked when the central IT group
determined that they had insufficient resources to support the project. The learning came when it
turned out that supporting the external contractor required significant use of internal resources,
very likely more resources than the original plan would have required.
Regrettably, in the end, the pilot tool was not user-friendly. Running it required the
following set of steps:
1. Extract materials list from design
2. Type in a UNIX command line (runs MSM query, returns .csv file)
3. Go to PC, open Excel application
4. Hit one button, get prompted to point at correct .csv file
5. Hit another button, filter MPNs
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6. Highlight MPN column, save as new file
7. Open Arrow website and login
8. Upload file from step 6 to Arrow
9. Hit "get cost and availability" button
10. Hit "risk manager" button
11. Download file with Arrow risk data now included
12. Paste results of file into Excel application
13. Hit another button to generate pivot tables of high risk parts
14. View results
This turned out to be very painful and confusing to the pilot users. To help encourage use of
the tool, I volunteered to run the Excel part of the application (steps 3-13) for them. All of them
took me up on this offer. The process from then on out was that after they did steps 1 and 2, they
would send me a note or call me to let me know the .csv file was ready. 10-20 minutes later I
would have the results, and e-mail the Excel output to them. While not ideal, and certainly not
real-time, 10-20 minutes is a much better turnaround time than the two weeks they are
accustomed to waiting for the MLAR. Note that they did not get the full output of the original
MLAR process, as they did not receive suggested alternatives for the risky parts.
The setup and results of the pilot program are discussed in detail in the following sections.
The result of the application development was the multi-step process described above, with the
MSM query followed by the third-party query followed by the algorithm chum.
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4.1.3 Lessons Learned
As stated previously, the biggest learning was that support of an external contractor required
a significant amount of internal IT resource support. The support requirements probably
completely eclipsed the value of going externally for programming resources.
Another learning was how critical the ease-of-use of the application was in order to
encourage designer use. The pilot participants were very supportive, and gave it their best effort,
but got frustrated easily and made it clear that the final version of the tool absolutely must be
very easy to use. Along these lines, it was not a good idea to split the application between UNIX
and Windows. Since the material list was in UNIX and the application was in Excel, it required
toggling back and forth adding unnecessary confusion. Having access to an internal Agilent IT
resource to program all steps of the application probably would have resolved the problem.
4.2 PILOT EXECUTION
The pilot project itself lasted four weeks, and was executed by four designers. The
designers used the application, which displayed the risk score as an output. The deterministic
risk score was used for the first two weeks of the pilot and the probabilistic risk score was used
for the remainder. Also output was a list of Code 4 parts, Code 3 parts, long leadtime parts, and
parts for which the third party data indicated at least one category to be high risk. A sample
output screen is demonstrated in Figure 16.
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4.2.1 Pilot Participants
Four electrical design engineers, who design printed circuit (PC) boards, participated in the
pilot. They were working on a total of twelve boards, across various phases of the design cycle.
Although ideally all of the boards tested would have been in the initial stages of design
(Investigation Phase or earlier), only two of the boards met this description. The remainder of
the boards were in the late stages of the process - Definition Phase or later. All of the boards
were evolutionary in nature and leveraged other designs to some degree.
The designers also utilized different CAD programs to design their boards. Mentor is the de
facto standard in Sonoma County, but several engineers still use the internally developed
program called EEDP. The difference in CAD programs was inconsequential to the pilot, as
both programs produce a pipe-delimited material list that was read by the EMRA tool. However,
future development efforts should be sure to include functionality to support both programs.
4.2.2 Desired Outcome
The key problems with the current methodology, discussed previously, were usability of
output, and speed of assessment or cycle time. The desired outcome of the EMRA pilot was to
improve upon both usability and cycle time, which should result in designers applying the
knowledge from the risk assessment. This application of knowledge would manifest itself if the
designers made component changes to their designs based on the identification of risky parts.
Therefore, action taken after receipt of information was the key desired result. Some of the
identification and replacement of risky parts would have occurred as part of the MLAR process.
It would be difficult to ascertain which changes were made exclusively as a result of the EMRA
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tool. Interviews with designers helped to determine an estimated percentage of the changes that
they would have been hesitant to change later in the design cycle when the MLAR is typically
performed.
Additionally, it was anticipated that designers would initiate earlier communication with the
Materials Engineering organization. The EMRA application did not provide recommended
replacement information, a key disparity between the output of the EMRA tool and the output of
the MLAR. Hence, when a designer became aware of a risky part after running the EMRA, he
could either select a replacement based on the parts selection tools available to him, or contact
the proper Materials Engineer to assist in the selection of an ideal replacement. Since the
designers were all running designs that had not yet been through the MLAR process, any contact
with Materials Engineering could be classified as earlier contact than otherwise would have
occurred.
Lastly, it was hoped that the designers would not attempt to "game" the process. To reduce
the likelihood of gaming, the risk algorithms were closely inspected to check for points of
leverage to improve the risk score. It appeared that the methods of improving the risk score all
legitimately reduced the materials risk of the design. However, post-pilot interviews were used
to determine if the pilot participants discovered any mechanisms to game the system.
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01932 R2,EITR1K iD1 15 Grwh o-tadr Mut-ore LmtdCnerad-sg
R10 RESISTOR 10K +-0.1% .125W 3 Growth Non-standard Multi-sourced Limited/Concentrated-Usage
4389-9915 U9 IC GATE CMOS/AC NAND QUAD 2-INP 2 Mature Stocked Multi-sourced Wide-Usage
2327-9911 U7 IC INTERFACE XCVR BIPOLAR 1 Growth Stocked Sole-sourced Wide-Usage
0165-1102 U12 IC INTERFACE DRVR/RCVR CMOS 1 Mature Stocked Multi-sourced Wide-Usage
1290-9021 U3 IC OP AMP H-SLEW-RATE DUAL 8 PIN ? Mature Stocked Sole-sourced Wide-Usage
U10 IC OP AMP H-SLEW-RATE DUAL 8 PIN ? Mature Stocked Sole-sourced Wide-Usage
1161-8769 Ul IC OP AMP PRCN DUAL 8 PIN ? Mature Stocked Sole-sourced Wide-Usage
0925-5252 W1 TRANSISTOR MOSFET 3 Mature Stocked Dual-sourced Wide-Usage
1606-0900 D12 DIODE-SWITCHING 7SV 200MA 2 Mature Stocked Multi-sourced Wide-Usage
1611-5676 D3 DIODE-ZNR 1N5338B 5.1V 10% # Mature Stocked Multi-sourced Limited/Concentrated-Usage
0680-3551 D6 DIODE-DUAL 70V 1ODMA 1 Mature Stocked Multi-sourced Limited/Concentrated-Usage
Figure 16: Sample EMRA Output (fabricated data)
4.2.3 Lessons Learned
The key lesson learned from the pilot process was that the application absolutely must be
very easy to use to get designers to use the tool at all. The pilot designers, given their level of
commitment to the project, were more patient with a difficult-to-use application than they or
their peers would be under normal circumstances. The final product, therefore, must be very
easy to use to encourage maximal designer usage.
4.3 PILOT RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Despite the hurdles, the pilot was undoubtedly a success. The success metrics for the project are
summarized in Figure 17.
63
R290119-3324 RESISTOR1 OK +-0. 1% .126W 3 Growth INon-standard Multi-sourced Limited/Concentrated-Usaqe
Success Metric How Measured Goal Value Actual Value
% of designers participating
Designer Usage by using the EMRA tool 100% 100%
Average runs/designer/board
Frequency of Use over pilot period >1 1.6
% improvement in total risky
Risk Reduction parts no goal set 1%
% of designers changing out
some of the identified risky
Designer Action components 100% 100%
% designers indicating they
would use the tool when
Designer Vote of Confidence implemented 100% 100%
Figure 17: Pilot Success Metrics
All goals were met or exceeded, with the exception of the improvement in total risky parts,
for which a goal percentage was not set prior to the pilot. It is difficult to directly compare these
metrics with the MLAR process because usage and action indicators are not currently tracked. It
is believed that 100% of designers use the MLAR process; the same usage observed during the
pilot. According to the pre-pilot survey, designers perform the MLAR process an average of 4
times per board over the entire design cycle. The 1.6 times per board the designers used the
EMRA during the weeks of the pilot is certainly a greater rate, the exact magnitude of which
depends on the length of the design cycle, but probably was influenced by the fact that the
designers were compelled to use the tool during the pilot.
A post-pilot survey administered in individual interviews and a pilot group discussion
session were key indicators of the success of the program. Every pilot participant indicated that
he liked having the risk information, and even more importantly, made changes to his designs
after viewing the results. While simple, these two conclusions are quite powerful. The fact that
the designers liked having the risk information indicates that they have some motivation to use
64
the EMRA tool. The fact that designers changed their designs to improve the component
selection indicates that real cost savings will be realized when designers are informed of risky
components. In other words, we can safely conclude that when the EMRA tool is rolled out to
designers, they will use it and they will consequently reduce the materials risk incurred by their
designs.
4.3.1 Third Party Data
Some specific feedback was that the third party data was particularly useful. Designers
primarily used Agilent preference code as the identifier of risky parts, but they appreciated
having visibility to the specific risk areas. Interviews both before and after the pilot indicated
that designers are frustrated with the current preference coding system because it tells them only
that a part is "ok to use" or "not ok to use"; it does not indicate why it may not be recommended
for new designs.
One designer related the following vignette: The EMRA tool indicated that one of the
technology-enabling components on his board was a Code 3 (not recommended for new design).
He then looked at the third party data and saw that it was a sole-sourced part. Since the
component was critical to the design and there were no other choices for suppliers, he knew that
the sole-sourcing was inevitable. But he was comforted somewhat by the other information the
third party provided, namely that there were several other customers for the component, it was in
its "maturity" stage, and the third party kept the component stocked. The detailed third party
data provided this particular designer with much more information than the Agilent preference
code and gave him the confidence to continue designing the board with the Code 3 component
included.
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4.3.2 Risk Metric
The pilot participants did not pay much attention to the overall risk score. Several of them
mentioned that it might be useful information for their managers, but they went straight for the
detail. This finding is consistent with the original concerns related in the last chapter, namely the
desire to align incentives with the risk metric. Specifically, if the designers are not being held
accountable for their risk scores, they do not have any incentive to improve the score, or in this
case, even take notice of it. It is important to note that the designers behaved in the right way
during the pilot, despite the lack of use of the metric, emphasizing the importance of the
component-level detail. Unfortunately, the design of the pilot program did not make room for
involvement of the project managers or even higher levels of management. The full
implementation of the EMRA tool must carefully consider the best way to get management to
buy into the value of the tool and set expectations for designers to score highly with their
designs. There are many alternative metrics to achieve the reduced LTB inventory objective,
only one of which is to measure the risk metric. The most obvious of these alternatives is to
measure levels of LTB inventory and set and expectation that LTBs will go down. This would
put pressure on the organization to think through the designs and to use the EMRA tool.
In the first two weeks of the pilot, all of the designs that were evaluated with the EMRA tool
were assessed with the deterministic method. During the remainder of the pilot, designs were
assessed with the probabilistic method. Before the pilot ended, all of the designs were re-
evaluated using the other method so that designers could directly compare the results of both
methods on the same design and provide feedback.
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According to the post-pilot feedback, the designers slightly preferred the deterministic risk
scoring to the probabilistic method. The reasons given for this preference were that the score
was easier to interpret, and was based on a more limited, straightforward set of assumptions.
The designers did like seeing the expected cost penalty shown with the probabilistic score, but
were wary of the number of assumptions that went into assessing it. In short, they preferred
simplicity.
4.3.3 Cost Savings
Figure 18 gives some statistics on the 12 boards that were evaluated by the EMRA tool.
These statistics represent the status of the boards before component changes were made. MPNs
= Manufacturer Part Numbers, and TPHR = Third Party High Risk Items. With very few
exceptions, there should be zero Code 4 parts in new designs, yet up to 4% of the components in
these pilot designs were Code 4, very likely due to the leveraged portions of the boards. On
average, for 17% of the components in the pilot designs, at least one of the categories reported
by the third party was deemed to be high risk. These statistics indicate that on the initial run of
these boards, there was room to improve the component selections.
67
........ # Third Party
Board # MPNs Code 4's % Code 4 Code 3's % Code 3 High Risk % TPHR
1 81 3 4% 11 14% 19 23%
2 420 0 0% 27 6% 79 19%
3 107 1 1% 7 7% 23 21%
4 271 0 0% 21 8% 93 34%
5 521 10 2% 14 3% 127 24%
6 352 1 0% 55 16% 101 29%
7 88 1 1% 5 6% 4 5%
8 195 4 2% 12 6% 14 7%
9 283 0 0% 26 9% 14 5%
10 610 7 1% 48 8% 88 14%
11 166 6 4% 60 36% 3 2%
12 209 1 0% 41 20% 4 2%
TOTAL 3303 34 1% 327 10% 569 17%
Figure 18: Statistics on Boards Evaluated During the EMRA Pilot
Figure 18 suggests that the third party data identifies a greater number of parts as high-risk
(17%) than the Agilent preference codes (11%). The causes of this are outside the scope of this
paper, but are being actively addressed by the Next Generation Preference Code project.
During the pilot, designers made changes to eight of the 12 designs assessed with the EMRA
tool. Figure 19 indicates how the cost savings during the pilot were calculated, and how the
potential savings in all of Sonoma County were conservatively extrapolated.
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Figure 19: Pilot Cost Savings Assessment Methodology
The projected cost savings of the EMRA tool cannot be disclosed, however a sense of the
magnitude of the savings can be determined by comparing the projected annual savings in
Sonoma County with the estimated annual holding costs for the lifetime buy inventory attributed
to EPSG. At current levels, the expected annual EMRA cost savings is approximately 10% of
the annual LTB inventory holding costs for all of EPSG. As LTB inventories are reduced (the
denominator decreases) and more EPSG groups utilize the EMRA tool (the numerator increases),
this percentage should increase significantly. Recall that the cost savings from Step 9 was
extrapolated only to the Sonoma County EPSG group, so further penetration can be expected
with a full implementation.
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Step # Assessment
1 List components changed out, and the component cost of each
Assume each changed component had a 100% chance of being
2 discontinued in the next year
Make an assumption regarding the demand of the instrument for
3 the next 7 years
Determine the expected cost of a lifetime buy and a redesign
4 based on the component cost
5 Assess the probability of incurring a lifetime buy vs. a redesign
Determine the expected cost of the discontinuance using the data
6 from steps 4 and 5
Sum the expected costs of discontinuance over all components
7 changed out
Average the expected costs of discontinuance over all
8 components changed out
Multiply by the total number of designers in Sonoma County and
9 the number of boards they work on per year
Multiply by 30% - the probability that the change would have
10 been made as a result of the MLAR process
5 IMPLEMENTATION
Interviews conducted throughout the internship with engineers and managers within the
R&D, Materials Engineering, Procurement, Order Fulfillment and ESCS groups resulted in the
gradual development of a vision for the EMRA tool. The vision, here referred to as the "Ideal
Situation", is essentially a wish list for a perfect materials risk assessment system. Although
there are many barriers and challenges that currently impede achieving the Ideal Situation, it is
useful to begin with the ideal, and then relegate to practicality.
There are four primary components to the Ideal Situation vision: (1) the use of Total Cost of
Ownership as the risk assessment metric, (2) system functionality and user interface, (3)
suggested alternate components, and (4) the software platform upon which to execute the
application.
5.1 TOTAL COST OF OWNERSHIP AS RISK ASSESSMENT
One of the pilot designer concerns was that the EMRA, while important, represented only
one of the Design for X (DfX) initiatives. The EMRA puts materials issues in front of the
designer, and ideally will also be integrated with his CAD environment. If the designers have
higher visibility to the EMRA than other DfX tools, it is foreseeable that the design teams may
focus on optimizing for materials, and consequently inadvertently sub-optimize another DfX
principle.
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An example of this is the use of leveraged designs. If several of Agilent's products use an
identical PC board, Agilent gains manufacturing flexibility. If the demand for one product drops
off while the demand for the other product is on the rise, the common PC board volumes do not
have to change. Inventories of that PC board do not experience wild swings. However, now
imagine that the first product to utilize the common PC board made use of a component that
became a high risk for discontinuance before the second product made use of the board. When
the designer for the second product decided to leverage the common PC board, he ran the EMRA
and discovered the component had a high lifecycle risk. So he swapped it out to a "good"
component. Now this common PC board is no longer identical for the two products. Is the
manufacturing flexibility gained by leveraging identically more beneficial to Agilent than
incurring the cost of using a LTB part in a new design? Should the designer attempt to swap out
a common part on all boards on which it is used at the same time to maintain commonality? It is
hard to answer these questions without doing some sort of tradeoff analysis. In an ideal world,
the designer would be able to answer these exact questions at the push of a button.
A good way to assess tradeoffs is to develop a common metric by which all decisions are
analyzed. In EMRA's case -- in fact for all of product design -- Total Cost of Ownership (TCO)
is a good candidate. In the previous example, the risk assessment tool would know which other
products were utilizing the identical board, and make a value assessment based on manufacturing
flexibility and the probability of stock outs and overstock situations. It would also be able to
assess the expected cost of using the board as-is, without changing out the risky components. It
could then compare the two and make a recommendation regarding whether or not to change out
the components.
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It is important to remember that materials risk extends to all boards that make use of a risky
component, not just the ones currently being analyzed. A TCO perspective requires
consideration of impacts to all products making use of a risky component.
Another tradeoff example is landed cost considerations' 0 . Factoring in logistics expenses,
such as the costs of shipping overseas, could lead Agilent to conclude that the expected TCO is
lower for a riskier domestic component than a less risky recommended alternate manufactured
overseas.
Yet another conventional designer tradeoff consideration is price vs. performance. Simply
graphing the two attributes and plotting the candidate parts can assess this tradeoff. Parts that
fall below the mean line (Parts B and C) are considered a better value. Figure 20 demonstrates a
typical price vs. performance tradeoff analysis. A total cost of ownership approach would go a
step further by attempting to assess the increased market value of improved performance, and
compare it to the increased product cost necessitated by the higher raw material cost.
10 Agilent's Bill Walker has been directing the landed cost effort, and published materials internally and externally
in this regard.
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Figure 20: Sample Price vs. Performance TradeoffAnalysis
There are plenty of examples of tradeoffs that ideally would be assessed at a designer level.
In the end, "The Goal"" of Agilent is to make money. One way to make more money is to
minimize the total cost of ownership for Agilent's products, signaling the importance of the TCO
metric.
Even simply from a discontinuance perspective, some kinds of discontinuances cost more
than others. For example, when a product is sole sourced, a costly major redesign is much more
likely to be the outcome of a discontinuance than a LTB.
"Goldratt, Eliyahu M., The Goal, (Great Barrington, MA: North River Press, 1992).
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Looking at TCO can be very beneficial to product planning at a strategic level. Decision
support systems could be used to predict when, in a product's lifecycle, Agilent will incur costs
associated with discontinuance (or anything else). This forward-looking capability would allow
product managers to look at the total instrument cost curve, and make product lifecycle decisions
such as when to phase in next generation products or when to discontinue old products based on
it. This view can be expanded to whole instrument family lifecycle planning. An example of
expected rate of component obsolescence over an instrument's lifecycle is shown in Figure 21.
Mapping the associated cost curve would allow the company to identify the point at which the
cost of component obsolescence exceeds the value of continuing to manufacture the instrument,
at which point a new product should be phased in.
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Figure 21: Sample Instrument Lifecycle Planning Input
Although it is the ideal way to assess tradeoffs and understand the bottom line impact of
decisions, there are several issues with the use of TCO as the primary metric. One problem, of
course, is that determining TCO is an incredibly complex task. Maintaining cost assumptions
used to determine TCO is also a complex and time consuming task. Given the complexity and
difficulty of maintaining this information, the likelihood that it will fall into a state of disrepair is
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high. And, as has been discussed, if the data feeding the system is no good, the system itself is
worthless. Garbage in, garbage out. For a TCO based system to be successful, the cost
assumptions and calculations would have to be agreed upon by all groups, with clear owners and
business processes to ensure the cleanliness of the data.
5.2 SYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY
The vision for the EMRA user interface was developed with (and for the most part, by) the
pilot designers. The ideal user interface would be a live decision support system, accessed from
within their CAD design environment, whether that be Mentor, EEDP, or another platform. Any
required connections to third party data systems would be live and transparent to the user. The
designer would select a menu function to "turn on EMRA highlighting". All parts deemed to be
high risk would be highlighted in red, directly on the schematic. All parts deemed to be medium
risk would be highlighted in yellow. Any redlines that a Material Engineer has suggested would
be obvious, whether or not the highlighting is turned on. A right mouse click on a highlighted
part would pop up a small window indicating why the part is considered risky (e.g. "Part is Sole
Sourced"), and then list the recommended replacement parts. Clicking on a recommended
replacement would take the designer to the manufacturer's data sheet to verify the parametric
data and ensure the part is a worthy replacement. A double click would replace the risky
component on the schematic with the improved component, and the highlighting would then
disappear.
The above describes the user interface for the design. However, many of the users of the
EMRA tool will be others such as Materials Engineers or NPI Planners. Interfaces for these
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users will function primarily through a reporting function of the software and a collaborative
design environment. For example, the Materials Engineering interface would allow the engineer
to select any design from the design vault, and filter for his or her commodity. The report would
list all components in the design (in list format, not the schematic view) in order of risk rating.
This would allow him or her to focus on the most critical items first. One click on a risky part
would pull up the list of recommended replacements. If the engineer wants to look for more
parts that didn't pop up, he could do a part search right there. Once the engineer decides on a
recommendation, he or she would click a button that says "submit redline". Then, when the
designer next opens up the file, the recommended redlines will be in place and the designer can
decide whether or not to accept the recommended change.
5.3 SUGGESTED ALTERNATE COMPONENTS
Every single pilot designer identified the need for a system that provides real-time
equivalent and suggested alternate components. They indicated that identifying problem parts is
only half the process. They then need to know what to do to fix them. This would significantly
increase the probability that they will actually make changes to the risky parts, especially on
leveraged designs. The ideal solution would include a system that allows the designer to have
access to recommended replacement parts immediately after discovering that a component is
"risky" as described in the last section.
One way to address the need for suggested alternates is to assign some tolerances around
parameters and do a replacement part search based on them. For example, if someone is looking
for a replacement for a 20-microfarad capacitor, the alternate part search engine could be set up
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to look for all capacitors with the exact same parameters except +/- 10% on the capacitance.
Then all capacitors that meet that specification would be displayed as alternates for the designer.
This is essentially the same way they search for original parts when they use one of the
automated search engines, so a translation into the EMRA tool should be relatively simple.
Some of the software suppliers investigated (details in the following section) also include a link
to the manufacturer's data sheet from the alternate parts list. The specifics regarding which
parametric data and the tolerances to search on for alternate parts should be designed, approved,
and supported by Materials Engineering.
5.4 SOFTWARE PLATFORM
The final version of the EMRA tool, especially as defined by the vision in the previous
sections, will require a significant investment in software. Agilent can either choose to develop a
system in-house (not recommended), or purchase and customize an existing software suite.
Developing the final EMRA system internally would require starting from scratch, because
the pilot tool would need to be almost completely replaced. Development efforts would require a
live third party data feed, live MSM data feed, multiple user interface designs, and schematic
capture integration. Using a commercial software system is certainly not without internal IT
resource requirements, but the resources required to develop an in-house system are likely to be
an order of magnitude higher.
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The second argument against developing an internal system is the non-standard end result.
Instead of having a software package that is supportable by the software company and
thoroughly documented, Agilent would end up with another homegrown solution that requires
significant long-term application support and revisions. Any customization required by the
different divisions within Agilent must be supported internally. For these reasons, I do not
recommend pursuing an internal solution.
As part of the research described in the Approach section for an off-the-shelf, long-term
software solution, I investigated four software companies. Two of them, Company 1 and
Company 4, also offer third party component risk assessment data sets. The four companies
have a wide range of product offerings and functionality. They also have a wide range of price
points. All of them were asked to assess the ballpark cost of doing the Beta test in Sonoma
County, as well as the cost of a full implementation. Company 1 and Company 4 consider their
databases to be a big part of their value proposition, and the Beta test would require full access to
these databases. For this reason, they are not able to offer reduced pricing for the MSM data
cleansing and mapping to their own systems just because it is part of a "Beta" test. They did
consider price reductions for the software (BOM grading) part of their packages. Company 2
and Company 3 offer a BOM grading tool, as well as other component management modules.
They do not offer a third party component database.
Figures 22 and 23 compare the software companies on functionality and cost.
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Function Company I Company 2 Company 3 Company 4
Industry component database X X
Data cleansing service X X
BOM grading tool X X X X
Schematic capture X X
Procurement analysis X
Preference management X X X X
Configurable risk scoring X X X X
Ability to incorporate third party data X X X X
Auto datasheet link X X
CM collaboration X
Figure 22: Software Functionality Checklist
The functions considered and compared were:
" Industry component database: offers a third-party data set with industry-level risk
assessment, very similar to the third-party data tested in the pilot.
" Data cleansing service: ensuring that the component data in the database is "clean";
in other words, data in all fields is consistent and correctly formatted. This avoids
errors and mistakes when processing risk algorithms.
" BOM grading tool: the basic EMRA functionality - the ability to identify risky
components and display the risk score to the user at both the component level and the
board level.
" Schematic capture: integration with CAD design environment.
" Procurement analysis: tracking and subsequent optimization of procurement
strategies. Credited for huge cost savings at Company 1's customers, but outside the
scope of this project.
* Preference management: ability to define and maintain a part preference scheme.
* Configurable risk scoring: permits Agilent to initialize and maintain the algorithm
used to determine component-level and board-level materials risk.
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* Ability to incorporate thirdparty data: ability to either include third party data in the
reference database, or to query a third party system on a case-by-case basis to obtain
the requisite information.
* Auto datasheet link: automatic link to the manufacturer's datasheet on the web.
Datasheets include specific performance specifications that would allow designers to
determine if the component is a suitable substitute for a risky part.
* CM collaboration: ability for procurement teams to collaborate online with design
engineers. An example would be a procurement engineer redlining a design with
suggested changes.
Functionality vs. Cost
Company I
Com pa ny 2Cmpy4
C-C'm pan 3y
Functionality
Figure 23: Functionality vs. Cost Software Comparison
Using this framework for assessing the software companies helped to compare them on a
fairly objective basis and eliminate some ambiguity. It is clear from Figure 23 that Company 1
offers the most functionality, with Company 4 next. Performing a tradeoff analysis as described
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in the previous section shows that from a value standpoint, Company 4 has a desirable
cost/functionality ratio, while Company 2 is comparably overpriced for the functionality offered.
Based on this analysis, the final recommendation at the end of the internship suggested working
with Company 4 to develop detailed requirements for the Beta test as well as the full
implementation. A final decision on whether to approve funds for the software purchase should
be made based on the outcome of these detailed negotiations. In general terms, the cost of the
systems varied from about six months of expected savings (when implemented Sonoma County
wide) to two years of savings initially with a recurring cost of one year of savings. Clearly, if the
recurring annual costs exceed the annual savings, the project is not worthwhile. The value of the
project will increase as the EMRA is implemented more widely. The negotiations should
consider the implementation, and hence expected savings, timeline.
5.5 CHALLENGES AND BARRIERS
The biggest barrier to wide implementation of the EMRA tool is Agilent's structure. The
tool must be effectively sold to all divisions, each of which has a unique set of requirements,
expertise, and systems. The ERP implementation will help reduce the disparity in IT systems,
but some legacy systems will remain.
Another important barrier is the amount of resources that will be required to fully develop
the tool interface and functionality as described in the vision. Some of the existing software
companies can accommodate many of the requirements, and are willing to do further
development work to optimize the software for Agilent's operating environment. However, as
discussed above, the software has a very hefty price tag, and custom development work will be
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even more costly. In addition, most companies charge an annual service fee for database
subscription and data maintenance. If Agilent chooses to do the development and support work
in-house, the total investment will probably be similar. Despite the huge value proposition to
Agilent of the system, the large system expenditures are difficult to disburse given the current
climate.
To dig into the details, a couple of potential issues may arise with respect to the suggested
alternates. For one, the MSM parametric data integrity is not currently up to par. This would
either need to be cleaned up, or Agilent would need to primarily rely on the third party
component data for the parametrics. Secondly, Materials Engineering is different in each
division. Some organizations may feel differently about how the alternate part search is set up.
One potential solution would be to have the enterprise Materials Engineering organization own
the alternate part search setup.
5.6 LESSONS LEARNED
The project and the internship were successful. However, there were some hurdles to
overcome, as well as mistakes made along the way. The key lessons learned involved driving
change from a corporate group in a decentralized company, working with centralized groups
(specifically IT) in a decentralized company, obtaining funds and resources for a project in tight
economic conditions, the value of metrics tightly linked to incentives, and the challenges in
valuing a new system.
82
5.6.1 Driving Change from a Corporate Group
The EMRA project has provided a data point for the following argument: in a decentralized
company, the best way to obtain support for a corporate project is to work from within the
divisions. By contributing to the design and development of the EMRA pilot tool, pilot
designers felt some ownership for it. They, therefore, will likely be champions for its
implementation.
5.6.2 Centralized IT in a Decentralized Company
Many decentralized companies encounter somewhat of a quandary when they attempt to
consolidate or centralize certain functions. This is essentially an attempt to have the best of both
worlds - the flexibility and quick decision-making expected from a decentralized organization,
and the cost effectiveness of centralized functions. Agilent has attempted to do this by
centralizing the IT group, and is encountering many of the same problems that other companies
have.
There appears to be a few necessary elements present for a centralized IT organization to
function efficiently:
* An effective methodology for prioritizing projects to ensure that the highest-value
projects are being resourced. This would require all divisions submitting project
requests to use the same set of assumptions when objectively assessing the value of their
project. It would also require that the decision makers in IT have a good understanding
of the various divisions' goals and active projects so that they can do a sanity check on
the value assessment.
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* All IT employees who may be assigned to a project should have the skills necessary to
take on almost any project. This is very difficult to accomplish in a decentralized
organization, since the divisions are likely to have many different systems, languages
and platforms resulting in an infinite combination of requisite skill sets. When this
condition is not met, projects with low value get resourced simply because employees
with the required skill sets are available, while high-value projects wait in line for certain
high-demand employees to become available.
It appears that neither of these conditions is currently met at Agilent. When a project with a
high value proposition does not get resources, it can be very frustrating for the project manager.
The only effective solution, as occurred with the EMRA project, is to "shop around" at the
division level for qualified technical resources that may be convinced to help. Resorting to this
solution effectively reverts to the model of decentralized IT.
Another potential area for improvement is Agilent's current IT resource request process. It
currently is not sufficiently responsive to meet the needs of the IT customers - internal project
managers. IT by definition is fast moving. And just about every project, especially in DCS, is
going to require IT resources of some sort. One solution may be for DCS (as well as other
customers) keep a project roadmap and review it regularly in staff meetings so that the IT
representative can stay abreast of upcoming resource requirements. To close the loop, the IT
representative should present back to DCS management regarding which projects he or she
foresees being unable to resource. Whether or not the IT POR Resource Request process has
been followed yet for all the projects, the representative should still be able to make an educated
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assessment. The projects not able to be resourced need management support and involvement to
ensure the formulation and success of contingency plans.
5.6.3 Project Challenges in Tight Economic Times
The most frustrating part of attempting to drive change in a tough economic climate is that a
positive ROI (return on investment) is not sufficient to justify a project. In this economic
downturn, Agilent reacted as most other companies did - by tightening expenditures company-
wide. A hiring freeze was enacted. Travel was severely restricted. All divisions saw their
budgets cut.
Spending restrictions impacted the EMRA project in the pilot phase, and will certainly
impact the speed and effectiveness of implementation. When IT resources were unavailable for
pilot application development, the funds necessary to procure an external contractor were
difficult to obtain. Funding for the contractor was secured primarily because the contracting
company does a significant amount of business with Agilent, and the existing contract was
slightly (in terms of percentage) expanded to accommodate the EMRA development.
Because recommendations for implementation include spending millions on software and/or
internal development and support for the application, implementation likely will not proceed
immediately. Very likely, implementation will proceed slowly until the economy improves and
funding and resources become more readily available.
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5.6.4 Alignment of Metrics and Incentives
The fact that the designers did not take much notice of the risk metric was a clear indication
that the metric was not valuable to them. This behavior is understandable; the designers want to
know what is broken and how to fix it. They are not particularly interested in gauging their
designs. During the pilot, this disconnect was not a problem because I was actively encouraging
the designers to use the EMRA, and keeping track of their progress. However, when the EMRA
is implemented on a wider scale, it is not practical to have someone constantly persuading the
designers to use the tool early and often. This is essentially the current model, with NPI planners
often the catalyst for the MLAR process. To be effective, the incentive to use the tool must be
systematic.
Incentive to use the tool should be tightly tied to the designers' performance evaluations.
And to make this link, a performance measure must exist for the materials risk incurred by or
avoided by the designer. The risk metric is this performance measure, and should be overtly
used by project managers to evaluate designers' performance. The designers themselves
suggested that this could best be accomplished if each designer reported his latest risk score at
regular project team meetings. The raw scores would inform the project manager of a potential
materials risk problem, and the rate of improvement over time would indicate the action being
taken to reduce materials risk problems. To further increase the visibility of the metric and
accountability of the project managers to reduce the materials risk of the instrument, the project
manager should report the risk scores during project phase reviews.
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5.6.5 New System Valuation
As indicated by the number of assumptions that had to be made to get a cost savings
estimate, it was very difficult to assess the value of the EMRA project. A new system is, by
definition, unproven. Although the EMRA pilot provided some hard data regarding the
projected usage of the tool, a lot of ambiguity remained even after the pilot. First, the
awkwardness of the pilot application made it difficult to assess how the designers would really
behave if they had a sleek, user-friendly system. Secondly, since EMRA would replace the
MLAR process, it was necessary to assess the degree to which EMRA contributed to materials
risk reduction above what would be accomplished with the MLAR process. Lastly, since the
internal data systems did not catalogue costs incurred due to discontinuance, it was difficult to
assess the exact expected costs of discontinuance and therefore the expected cost savings when
discontinuance is avoided.
To summarize, it is very difficult to assign a value to a new system. Under this kind of
ambiguity, it is difficult for decision makers to dedicate human and financial resources to a
project, the payoff of which is uncertain. For the EMRA project, this dynamic was further
compounded by the economic climate.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis described the development of a risk analysis methodology and supporting tools
to help design engineers reduce the use of parts at high risk for obsolescence in new products.
Some key takeaways from the project development, pilot program execution and pilot results are
summarized below.
Design engineers, in general, are aware of supply chain risks and honestly want to contribute
to design for supply chain (as well as other DfX) efforts. However, their primary job is to design
circuits and boards, so they cannot spend a significant amount of time getting the data and
information they need to participate in DfX efforts. If they had the data readily at their
fingertips, they could more easily and quickly make DfX decisions. To be successful, a
materials risk analysis system must be very quick and easy to use. It must not only inform
designers of risky components present in their design, but also recommend actions to improve
the selections.
The second takeaway regards execution of a project requiring significant IT resources in an
environment where these resources are in very high demand. An interesting twist at Agilent was
assessing the structural conflict of a centralized IT group functioning in a highly decentralized
organization. A contingency plan that was executed during the internship was the use of an
external contractor to provide programming support. Interestingly, the contractor required
significant internal IT support to complete the project, and in the end Agilent probably expended
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more IT man-hours supporting the contractor than they would have by supporting the project
entirely internally.
Lastly, metrics will only drive behavior if the metric is closely linked to performance
evaluation. During the pilot project, the risk metric was not being used to evaluate the designers
in any way. This permitted them to objectively assess the value of the information that was
being provided. They valued the detailed component data, and hardly acknowledged the risk
metric itself at all. In contrast, project managers and materials and supply chain groups would
likely use the risk metric exclusively to track performance and trends. In order to properly align
goals and incentives, the interests between the two groups need to be closely synchronized.
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